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Abstract. This paper investigates the endurance of a national forest management programme in Burkina Faso
called Chantier d’Aménagement Forestier (CAF), which focuses on the participatory sustainable production of
fuelwood and is widely supported by international donors despite evidence of its shortcomings. We analyse the
surprising persistence of the CAF model as a case of the territorialisation of state power through the reproduc-
tion of “political forests” – drawing on the work of Peluso and Vandergeest (2001, 2011). Analysing some the
shortcomings and incoherencies of the model, we bring to light the role of non-state actors in the reproduction of
the CAF as a “political forest”. We show that informal regulatory arrangements have emerged between state and
non-state actors, namely merchants and customary authorities, over the production of fuelwood. We call these
arrangements “fuelwood territorialities” because they have contributed to keeping the CAF’s resource model
unquestioned. With fuelwood territorialities, we draw attention to the role of non-state actors in the reproduction
of “political forests”, that is, the process of state territorialisation through forest governance. This analysis helps
clarify how certain areas, such as the CAFs, keep being officially represented as “forest” even though they are
dominated by a patchwork of fields, fallows, and savannahs and do not have the ecological characteristics of one.
1 Introduction
The word “forest” is polysemic; it has a diversity of mean-
ings that reflect not only a diversity of ecological definitions
but also power relations over territory. In Burkina Faso, for
example, many forest resource users whose first language
is Mooré use the word weoogo, which best translates into
English as “bush”. This word designates an area away from
dwellings that may or may not be populated with trees, but
it is commonly used as a translation for the word “forest” in
French, the official state language in Burkina Faso. Interest-
ingly, the first author once noticed that an area changed name
when it became part of a state policy to formalise the area as
a state forest: neighbouring residents stopped using the word
weoogo to refer to the area under new official management
and started using the term forêtwa, a vernacular pronuncia-
tion of the French word forêt. This was odd because the new
word forêtwa did not designate a new landscape category –
the drylands bush area previously referred to as weoogo was
essentially unchanged. Rather, the change of term reflected
a jurisdictional change, as the place previously referred to as
weoogo was no longer under unofficial customary control,
but under official state control. This anecdote illustrates that
what we refer to as “forest” is not only a matter of ecology
but also the product of socio-political processes and relations
of territorial control. The diversity of forest definitions is not
a problem in and of itself, but it can become problematic for
the management of forest resources: if the definitions of what
a forest is, where it starts and ends, cannot be agreed upon,
how may it be possible to determine where forest manage-
ment programs ought to take place? See Côte et al. (2018),
the introduction to this special issue. In this paper we are
particularly interested in the conditions under which some
places are officially designated as “forest” and continue to be
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chosen by policymakers and donors for forest management
even if they do not have the features of “forests”.
We tackle this issue through the case of the Chantier
d’Aménagement Forestier (CAF, which translates into En-
glish as “forest management worksites”), a participatory
forestry model for the sustainable production of fuelwood
in Burkina Faso. This model has emerged in 1986 with the
aim to “rationalise” fuelwood production through the im-
plementation of participatory forestry within specific areas.
Many of these areas were previously gazetted under the
French colonial regime (forêts classées), and neighbouring
residents were forbidden to clear natural resources for agri-
culture there. Under the CAF model, parts of gazetted ar-
eas, also called CAF areas, were opened up to neighbour-
ing residents for the production of fuelwood. The model re-
lies on the creation of woodcutter cooperatives made up of
neighbouring residents and called forest management groups
(FMGs, groupements de gestion forestière in French) that
are in charge of sustainable fuelwood production and com-
mercialisation. The FMGs that operate in CAF areas are
meant to meet the fuelwood demand of main cities, espe-
cially the capital city, but the model has many shortcomings.
Namely, the majority of fuelwood that is consumed in Burk-
ina Faso is actually produced outside CAF areas, and within
CAF areas forest regeneration has been hard to maintain.
Despite these shortcomings, the model has expanded con-
siderably – there are nowadays at least 26 CAFs (MEDD,
2013a), and the model has also attracted significant interna-
tional donor funding, the most recent being from the For-
est Investment Program (FIP), a global forest management
scheme that aims to prepare countries for the international
Reduction of carbon Emissions from Deforestation and land
Degradation (REDD+) initiative. In this paper we investigate
the conditions under which the expansion of the CAF model
has taken place despite its shortcomings.
Our analytical point of departure is that CAF areas share
characteristics with “political forests”, a concept proposed
by Peluso and Vandergeest (2001, 2011) that characterises
“lands that states declare as forests” and that “are a critical
part of colonial-era state-making both in terms of the territo-
rialisation and legal framing of forests and the institutionali-
sation of forest management as a technology of state power”
(Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001:762). This notion is useful be-
cause it proposes that sites declared as forests are not only de-
marcated as such for their ecological characteristics but also
instrumental to the territorialisation of state power. It sug-
gests that political economic interests, as well as ecological
scientific criteria, underlie the demarcation and maintenance
of certain sites as “forests”. In this paper we extend this no-
tion to the case of the CAF model in Burkina Faso, and we
analyse the political economic relations around the produc-
tion of fuelwood through which CAF, as a “political forest”,
is reproduced.
We call these political economic relations “fuelwood ter-
ritorialities”. They characterise the convergence of state and
non-state actors’ interests in the production of fuelwood re-
sources as the CAF territorial model lands on the ground.
We show that within CAF areas, the model has better served
the interests of wholesale fuelwood merchants rather than
those of FMG cooperatives, but this has not been brought
into question by the government, partly because it would
jeopardise its chance to secure international funds for for-
est management in Burkina Faso. Outside CAF areas fuel-
wood production is largely considered as informal but it is
actually regulated by a system of fuelwood permits delivered
by the central forest administration. This official regulatory
arrangement has been difficult to apply in practice, however,
because state presence is too sparse to apply it on the ground,
and informal regulative arrangements have emerged between
local forest agents and customary authorities. We call these
relations between state and non-state actors “fuelwood ter-
ritorialities”, and we argue that they contribute to the state
territorialising effect of keeping CAFs as official “forests”
despite the model’s shortcomings.
With this analysis we hope to advance an understanding
of the conditions under which “political forests” are repro-
duced. Rather than being coercively imposed from above, we
show that state forest policy is reproduced through the con-
vergence of specific state and non-state political economic
interests in the production of forest resources, in this case
fuelwood resources. The distinction between fuelwood mer-
chant and customary territorialities is important because it
shows that different kinds of non-state actors can become en-
rolled in the process of state territorialisation through forest
policy, and it shows that different kinds of state–non-state re-
lations occur within and outside “political forests” (see also
Gautier and Hautdidier, 2012; Hautdidier et al., 2004). The
fuelwood territorialities we describe here are not meant to be
exhaustive – for example other non-state actors may also be
involved in the reproduction of “political forests” through the
convergence of interests with state actors. They are rather il-
lustrative of the role and different kinds of state and non-state
political economic relations around forest resource produc-
tion, which sustain forest policy despite its shortcomings.
Our analysis is based on the first author’s research on
the mismatches between fuelwood policy and practice in
Burkina Faso, including ethnographic field research in the
Yatenga province between 2011 and 2012 and regular vis-
its since, and on the second author’s long-term research en-
gagement on fuelwood policies in the Sahel, particularly in
Burkina Faso. This combined research experience provides
a basis to put together a realistic picture of the CAF policy
on paper and on the ground. We start with a characterisation
of “fuelwood territorialities” and the way they help us under-
stand the reproduction of “political forests”. We then present
a brief history of the CAF model, its popularity, and its res-
onance with the “political forest” and its shortcomings. This
is followed by our description of two kinds of fuelwood ter-
ritorialities, involving relations between state agencies with
merchant and customary authorities, respectively inside and
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outside CAFs, and the way these relations make the CAF
model difficult to abandon as a site of forest management in
Burkina Faso.
2 Of “political forests” and “fuelwood
territorialities”
Forest management policymakers often assume that there is
such a thing as “forest” out there, waiting to be managed.
However, work in political ecology has demonstrated that na-
ture is always “situated” (Haraway, 1991), in the sense that
“nature” is always seen from somewhere, and different ac-
tors have different ways of defining “forest” (Goldman et
al., 2011). However, this poses a dilemma for the sustainable
management of forest resources, for if forest can be defined
in multiple ways, how can appropriate forest management
sites be found? The work of Nightingale (2003) illustrates
this dilemma in Nepal, where she analysed the discrepancies
between local forest users’ and aerial photographic represen-
tations of how a forest area improved and degraded. Rather
than reifying one account over another and trying to get at the
“truth”, she analysed why definitions differed and showed
that discrepancy could be explained as a reflection of the
competing relations of control over the area between local
users and central government. Her work shows that meanings
of “deforestation” and “forest” are entangled with competing
claims for land control, and they need to be continually ex-
amined critically if their associated policies are to have any
effect on forest dynamics.
Peluso and Vandergeest’s (2001, 2011) concept of the “po-
litical forest” is useful here because it takes the political di-
mensions of defining forest into consideration. In our view,
this work articulates two key political dimensions of forests.
Firstly, it emphasises that “forests” are “not natural or uni-
versal categories of knowing but constructions” (Peluso and
Vandergeest, 2001:801), and these constructions play a part
in processes of state territorialisation. They make this argu-
ment through several cases in South-East Asia, where they
showed that areas officially referred to as “forests”, such as
gazetted and reserved forests, came together not only through
scientific logics of conservation but also through political
logics of control over space and populations. Key to this
state territorialisation process is the way government policies
have drawn on scientific forestry that advocates the creation
of spaces dedicated to forestry and separated from agricul-
ture, thereby criminalising the customary land use practices
of nearby residents. This dimension echoes the case of the
CAF model we will describe below in Burkina, which relies
on the separation of forestry and agriculture but also draws
on participatory governance principles to legitimise this sep-
aration.
Secondly, “forest” is political because government logic
underlying forest policy is often challenged in practice, and
notions of “forest” and forest management are “contested
both within the states’ apparatus and by its intended subjects”
(Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001:800). Peluso and Vandergeest
illustrate such contestation from within the state as an ex-
ample, with two quotes from colonial officers with conflict-
ing opinions about what to do with the residents surround-
ing valuable forest areas (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001:761-
2). In other contexts, forest policy can also be more openly
challenged, or transformed on the ground when the presence
of government is scarce, and policy application is scanty. In
Ghana, for example, Wardell and Lund (2006) demonstrate
that forest governance is well qualified as a product of “the
rents of non-enforcement” rather than as a product of gov-
ernment law enforcement, because forest reserves have cre-
ated an “illegality” that is a source of monetary and politi-
cal rent-seeking for both local customary chiefs and forest
agents. In Senegal, Blundo (2011) analyses other kinds of
informal arrangements between state forest agents and in-
ternational NGOs as cases of the “informal privatisation” of
ground-level forestry service. So when the application of for-
est policy falls short, a number of non-state actors, such as
customary authorities and international NGOs in these cases,
become involved. Rather than undermining state territorial-
isation, their involvement can be constitutive of maintain-
ing forest policies and “political forests” when their interests
converge with those of states.
In this vein, Bassett and Gautier (2014) argue that terri-
torialisation is “polycentric” to emphasise a “contrast to the
state-centric focus of the territorialisation literature” and “to
illustrate that the production of territories springs from mul-
tiple sources and locations” (Bassett and Gautier, 2014:3).
We draw on this “polycentric” understanding to state territo-
rialisation and to conceptualise the reproduction of “political
forests” not only as a result of coercive state forest policy
imposed from above but also through the relations between
state and non-sate actors around the production of forest re-
sources. A good example can be found in the work of Gau-
tier et al. (2011) in Mali, where government policy aiming
to institutionalise village-level fuelwood “harvesting spaces”
under the control of professional woodcutters associations
actually opened up opportunities for customary authorities
to assert territorial claims and political leverage with central
government. In this case, the contestation did not bring down
fuelwood policy; on the contrary, the tacit government recog-
nition of customary control over these “harvesting spaces”
was part and parcel of the reproduction of fuelwood policy.
Drawing on these insights, we conceptualise fuelwood terri-
torialities as converging political economic interests between
state and non-state actors around the production of fuelwood
resources, which contribute to the state territorialising effect
of keeping certain areas demarcated officially as “forests” de-
spite forest policy shortcomings.
Below we illustrate “fuelwood territorialities” in the case
of the CAFmodel in Burkina Faso, and we show the role they
play in the reproduction of CAF areas as “political forests”.
We start with a brief history and description of the CAF
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model and its popularity with international donors, which
partly explain why it has been reproduced. However, this
paradigm is not applied to the letter, as we show in Sects. 4
and 5. Rather, the CAF model is appropriated on the ground
in ways that profit particular interest groups around the pro-
duction of fuelwood, the merchants inside CAFs, and local
customary authorities outside CAFs. These different “fuel-
wood territorialities” are important because they help us ac-
count for the ways in which the CAF model, as a “political
forest”, is reproduced over time.
3 CAF as the “political forest” of Burkina Faso
The CAF is a national forestry model that emerged in the
mid-1980s in Burkina Faso, with the aim to “rationalise” fu-
elwood production. It emerged at the intersection of a rising
concern about fuelwood shortages in the Sahel in the 1970s
(Ribot, 1999, 2001) and the growing popularity of partic-
ipatory approaches to forest resources management world-
wide in the 1980s (Bertrand et al., 2006). The model shares
features with the “political forest” described by Peluso and
Vandergeest (2001, 2011): it is implemented within places
gazetted under the French colonial regime, and it is based on
scientific forestry principles that spatially segregate agricul-
ture from forest production, thereby also criminalising agri-
cultural practices that may take place within CAF areas. The
model has been very popular with donors interested in sup-
porting forest management. Key to this popularity has been
the participatory approach underlying the CAF model, but
biomass within CAF areas has been hard to maintain. In this
section we describe the rise of the CAF model as a “politi-
cal forest”, its shortcomings, and its puzzling popularity with
donors.
Before the CAF model emerged, concerns for protecting
the natural resource base in Burkina Faso translated into large
state-monitored planting programmes in the 1970s. Large-
scale plantations under state control proved to be rather in-
efficient, and their failure led to the adoption in the 1980s
of a small-scale village-level tree planting project called bois
de villages (village woodlands), but these were not dedicated
to be a source of fuelwood. Village-based plantations were
of limited size, generally planted with eucalyptus, and sold
as construction wood. As elsewhere in the subregion, the na-
tional effort of tree plantation has been abandoned since the
1980s to the profit of participatory natural forest manage-
ment, with a double objective of conservation and fuelwood
production (Gazull and Gautier, 2014). The CAF model orig-
inated in this context, under the brief but intense 3-year rev-
olutionary regime led by the highly charismatic late Captain
Thomas Sankara, and within what he called “the three strug-
gles” against deforestation (including the fight against abu-
sive woodcutting, bush fires, and the wandering of livestock).
The first CAF worksite was launched in 1986 and funded by
the FAO under a project called “Management and exploita-
tion of forests to supply the city of Ouagadougou with fire-
wood” (Projet PNUD/FAO/BKF/85/011). Despite the politi-
cal rupture after the fall of the Sankara regime in 1987, the
project was maintained and indeed grew. In 2013 there were
26 earmarked CAF areas, and there are currently over 400
FMGs (the woodcutter cooperatives that manage CAF areas)
registered throughout the country (MEDD, 2013a).
The CAF model reflects a dominant forestry ontology that
sees the overexploitation of fuelwood as a crux of deforesta-
tion dynamics in the Sahel. It aims to produce fuelwood to
supply the urban centres (mainly Ouagadougou), whose de-
mands are perceived as the largest and are thereby also the
main driver of fuelwood-induced deforestation. The model is
inherited from former colonial forestry in two main ways.
Firstly, CAF areas are mainly located in the Centre-West
region and in areas that were initially reserved by French
colonial administrators as “gazetted forests”. These were all
reserved between the 1930s and 1950s through a control
regime that excluded residents’ agroforestry practices; their
reservation aimed to provide the colonial administration with
timber wood, namely for the construction of a railroad be-
tween Abidjan and Niamey, and they are still gazetted to
this day (Côte, 2015). As the Ministry of Environment ex-
plained, “the idea behind it was for the state to open up
the gazetted forests and transform them into forests with a
regime of controlled exploitation because, at that time, stud-
ies started showing that it was possible to exploit a forest
while conserving it though a system of rotation” (Ministry
en Environment staff, Ouagadougou, 11 April 2012). So the
CAF model is applied in these gazetted areas because of the
government’s progressive commitment to emerging partici-
patory forestry approaches in 1980s, but also because for-
est resources within these areas are relatively abundant, as
they are situated along important rivers, and they are there-
fore considered fit for fuelwood production.
Secondly, the CAF model is based on contemporary par-
ticipatory forestry paradigm, but it also continues to draw on
colonial forestry norms. These norms include the designation
of areas subdivided in forest management worksites under
specific fuelwood management plans and terms of reference
(Gautier et al., 2015). In order to create a CAF, a forest man-
agement plan (plan d’aménagement forestier) must be elab-
orated, and it must identify when and where fuelwood can be
cut – typically a CAF area is divided into 15 plots that are
exploited each year on rotation basis of 1 plot per year over
15 years.1 The participatory aspect of the CAF model comes
1There is no existing national map of the different CAFs of
Burkina Faso, although the government is currently delineating the
CAF areas. One reason why such a long-standing program as the
CAF has produced no overall cartographic representation of its
achievements is that the boundaries of CAF areas are actually more
dynamic than its technical specifications, such as the rotational plots
described here, would suggest. For example, within one of the orig-
inal CAF areas, residents are currently negotiating that part of the
areas be declassified based on the existence of their own agricultural
Geogr. Helv., 73, 165–175
M. Côte and D. Gautier: Fuelwood territorialities 169
from the fact that the plots are managed by local woodcutter
cooperatives, the FMGs who provide the woodcutting work-
force and benefit from fuelwood sales. The members of the
FMGs work accordingly with scientific ecological calcula-
tions that are perceived as necessary to ensure the renewabil-
ity of forest resources. The management plan is overseen by
forestry technicians who are hired to offer woodcutters train-
ing (in cutting technics, the regeneration of exploited plots
by direct seedling, and early bush fire practice) and it must be
validated at ministerial level. In other words the CAF model
is an agreement, or a fuelwood concession, between the cen-
tral state and the FMGs, but the latter have limited access and
management rights.
The CAF model is presented as state-of-the-art forestry
in the wider Sahel region, and its participatory aspect has
been instrumental in securing external funding for national
forest management programs in Burkina Faso. For example
in 2010, Burkina was chosen with 5 other countries out of
the 48 ones proposed worldwide for the global FIP’s pilot
project for a global REDD+ program (MEDD, 2013b:41).
There are two main components to this program that amount
to USD30 million in total, half of which is dedicated to
the “Gazetted Forests Participatory Management Project for
REDD+” (PGFC/REDD+) funded by the African Develop-
ment Bank. This significant funding is based on the fact that
“the need for increased community participation in forest
management has been gradually recognised during the past
three decades” and that it has “implemented a participatory
management of gazetted forests through FMGs geared to-
wards the sustainable exploitation of forest resources, mainly
wood.” (AfDB, 2013:4).
The popularity of the CAF model is surprising, however,
because it has not had the expected ecological effects. Firstly,
a large majority – an estimated 85% – of the fuelwood con-
sumed in cities is actually produced outside CAF areas. In
theory, fuelwood commercialisation outside CAFs is not il-
legal if it is done with a fuelwood permit, but it is poten-
tially fraudulent. CAF areas are considered as biologically
fit for fuelwood production in Burkina Faso, as “managed
forests”, marked out and managed by a group of profes-
sional woodcutters (Gautier and Compaoré, 2006). In con-
trast the rest of the country is not organised according to
a “management plan”; for this reason, the fact that the vast
majority of fuelwood that is commercialised actually comes
from outside CAF areas is generally considered as a fail-
ure of the model (Sawadogo, 2007; Ouédraogo, 2009). Sec-
ondly, within CAF areas, natural regeneration has been hard
to maintain. Sawadogo (2007) shows that the direct seedling
fields in this areas (Forest Services, personal communication, 2017).
This kind of politics over boundaries and the absence of maps for
CAF areas support our analysis of the CAFs as a “political forest” –
as sites of struggle over state territorialisation. Further research on
national cartographic representations of CAFs would be very valu-
able as they would shed further light on the technologies through
which CAFs are reproduced as “political forests”.
used for promoting the regeneration and the rebuilding of
ecosystems within the CAFs fails to compensate the wood
destocking from trees that takes several decades – more than
the 15 years devised in a typical management plan – to reach
their maturity (see Tanyi, 2017, and Puentes-Rodriguez et
al., 2017, for similar results). Finally, neighbouring residents
notoriously extend agricultural fields within the CAF areas
(Guirro Ouedraogo, 2003; Hagberg, 2000; Zougouri, 2008).
So like the “political forest”, CAF areas are lands set aside
for a particular forest management purpose and, according to
the CAF model, these areas are officially marked out as the
only areas biologically fit for fuelwood production in Burk-
ina Faso. However, evidence shows that only a very small
part of the wood coming out of CAF areas actually supplies
the city of Ouagadougou, that biomass decreases within CAF
areas at the end of their rotation, and that CAF areas are not
composed so much of a forest landscape but of a mosaic of
field and woodlands. Despite these shortcomings, the CAF
endures as model for official “forests” in Burkina Faso. Key
to the reproduction of the CAF model has been the support of
international donor funding, and key to this support has been
the combination of scientific forestry around the sustainable
production of wood and the involvement of “community par-
ticipation” through FMGs created for the CAF model. Be-
low we analyse the political economic relations underlying
fuelwood production within CAF areas, and we show that
while the model aims to benefit the FMGs, wholesale fuel-
wood merchants actually benefit the most out of fuelwood
production within this model. We show that the government
is aware that FMGs are losing out but, rather than questioning
the model and the merchants’ upper hand, it calls for a multi-
plication of CAF areas, an expansion of the model, to address
the issue. We call CAF areas “merchant fuelwood territorial-
ity” not because merchants are trying to establish territorial
control over CAF areas but because the convergence of mer-
chant and state political economic interests contributes to the
reproduction of the CAF model as a “political forest” and to
its state territorialising effect. In the next section we examine
the CAF model in greater detail, with an emphasis on these
various relations of fuelwood production.
4 Merchant fuelwood territoriality inside CAFs
The CAF model aims to “hand over” the management
of CAFs areas to neighbouring residents and many of
the model’s features reflect this participatory underpinning.
FMGs must be constituted of local residents, operate as a
local woodcutter cooperative, and ideally have a monopoly
over fuelwood production within their CAF areas. A CAF
comes together after each village neighbouring the CAF area
sets up their FMG group, which together form a union of
FMGs. The FMG agrees on a management plan that is drawn
and maintained with the technical assistance of a team of for-
est technicians headed by a technical director. Part of the
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fuelwood sales generated by FMG woodcutters contributes
to a forest management fund (fond d’aménagement forestier
in French) that pays the technicians’ salaries. The fund also
finances technical activities in the CAF including woodcut-
ters training to cutting technics, the regeneration of exploited
plots by direct seedling, and early bush fire practice. Another
smaller part of fuelwood sales contributes to a village devel-
opment fund (fond d’aménagement villageois in French) that
aims to finance non-forestry activities in the villages such
as pasture management, or other activities like hunting or
the gathering of non-timber forest products outside the CAF
worksites.
In practice this participatory model has proven difficult to
realise (Delnooz, 2003). Firstly, fuelwood production within
CAFs is subjected to more burdensome regulation than out-
side CAFs, which has played against FMGs and in favour
of wholesale fuelwood merchants. Table 1 details the fiscal
regime pertaining fuelwood production in Burkina Faso. It
shows that outside CAFs woodcutters must only pay wood-
cutting and circulation permits, but FMG woodcutters within
CAFs must also contribute to the forest management and
village development funds.2 In 2002, the cost of producing
1m3 of wood (CFA2200 in this case) broke down into 14%
attributed to state taxes, 50% to woodcutters, and 36% to
the two funds that are only apply to CAF (Kambire et al.,
2015:28). Fuelwood sold by FMG woodcutters is therefore
inevitably more expensive than fuelwood produced outside
CAFs. According to Ouédraogo (2006) the main issue with
the CAF model is that the prices for the cubic metre of wood
is fixed by the government, and this price is too low and has
not changed for the last 20 years. The production of fuel-
wood within CAF areas has provided merchants the oppor-
tunity to pick up larger quantities of wood in one single site,
compared to production outside CAFs that is smaller-scale
and more dispersed, and merchants have generally benefitted
from this model despite the fact that fuelwood is cheaper and
less regulated outside CAFs.
Secondly, profits from the sale of fuelwood produced
within CAFs have also largely benefitted fuelwood mer-
chants rather than FMGs. The market chain analysis under-
taken by Ouédraogo (2007) in 2005, for example, examined
the structuration of profit from fuelwood sales based on data
collected from 8 CAF sites and 98 commercial intermediaries
(merchants and retailers). The study shows that based on the
fuelwood consumer price, 28% of profits are generated by
merchants, 12% by retailers in the city of Ouagadougou, and
only 9% constitute the woodcutter’s revenue. Coulibaly et
al. (2007) and Bouda et al. (2011) come to similar findings,
furthermore emphasising that 50% of the share goes to cen-
2There are also ongoing discussions at the national level for the
institutionalisation of a communal tax on fuelwood production – see
Côte (2015) and Karambiri (2015) – but this has not been officially
instituted yet.
tral treasury (including not only fuelwood production taxes
but also those collected from merchants and retailers).
These shortcomings are known among official circles, but
instead of bringing into question the political economic struc-
ture of the model throughout the entire value chain, from
the tree to the consumer, the central government advocates
a further expansion of the model, including the same actors,
powers, and practices as they are at present. Responding to
UK and USA donor concerns about the CAF model in 2015,
the government acknowledged that “wood producers cannot
make consistent revenues at the moment” and that “the fu-
elwood exploitation . . . cannot be sustainable because it does
not ensure the replacement of the wood that was cut down”.
The same document further explains that “[i]t is the marginal
nature of the total production of forest management units
[CAF] that inhibits its contribution to improving the gover-
nance of forest resources management”.3 In other words, it is
suggested that if there were more CAFs these shortcomings
would go away, and the upper hand of merchants over the
regulatory chain is left unquestioned.
So CAFs are fuelwood concessions allocated to woodcut-
ter cooperatives, the FMGs, aiming to rationalise fuelwood
production by geographically concentrating fuelwood pro-
duction in the most biologically fit forests. In practice this
has been difficult to realise, partly because FMG coopera-
tives have struggled to make sufficient profits. Instead the
CAF model has largely benefitted fuelwood merchants who
are able to pick up large quantities of fuelwood at a price that
allows them to come out as the winners of profits along fuel-
wood chain. The central government has not challenged this
significant deviation from the CAF participatory vision and
in fact emphasised the low profits of FMGs as an argument
to secure external funding that will expand the CAF model
further. The convergence of merchant and government polit-
ical economic interests around keeping the CAF status quo
contributes to reproducing the CAF model as a “political for-
est” in Burkina Faso. We call it merchant fuelwood territori-
ality because it contributes to further expansion of territorial
state power in Burkina Faso through this fuelwood policy and
through the expansion of the CAF model. Below we show
that outside CAF areas, a different kind of relation and con-
verging interests between state and non-state actors, which
we call customary fuelwood territoriality, also contributes to
indirectly reproducing the CAF model in Burkina Faso.
3See p. 2 and 7 of https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/
sites/default/files/meeting-documents/burkina_faso_response_to_
us_and_uk_comments.pdf (last access: 13 January 2018). The
Climate Investment Fund is a World Bank funded project that is
involved in Burkina Faso through the Forest Investment Program
that aims to introduce carbon market schemes through forest
management initiatives; see MEDD, 2011).
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Figure 1. Truck picking up fuelwood within a CAF (a) and a wagon carrying fuelwood that was gathered outside CAF areas (b) (source:
authors).
Table 1. Fiscal regime over fuelwood production in Burkina Faso (source: adapted from CILSS, 2007:20).
Fiscal item Amount Destination Fee characteristic Where the
description (CFA franc 1000 = EUR1.50) fee is applied
Woodcutting permit 300 per m3 of wood Central treasury Fixed National level
Village development fund 200 to 600 CAF village development fund Varies across CAFs CAF areas only
Professional card (for merchants) 4000 per year Communal budget Varies across municipalities National level
Depot permit (for retailers) 2000 per year Central treasury Fixed National level
Circulation permit 300 per m3 of wood Central treasury Fixed and applicable at national level National level
CAF management fund 50 to 200 per m3 of wood CAF management fund Varies across CAFs CAF areas only
Woodcutter salary 900 to 1700 per m3 of wood Woodcutter Varies across CAFs CAF areas only
5 Customary fuelwood territoriality outside CAFs
In this section we bring to light another kind of fuelwood
territoriality that occurs outside CAF areas and helps us un-
derstand the endurance of the CAF model in Burkina Faso.
Above we mentioned that fuelwood producers outside CAFs
are subjected to less oversight than the FMGs operating
within CAFs: woodcutters operating outside CAFs must only
obtain a permit with a localised forest agent. This regula-
tion has also been hard to apply in practice however, and
the scanty regulation over fuelwood has generated discon-
tent among resource users. Informal institutions, which we
call tiis nanamse (sing. tiis naaba) to follow the vernacular
terminology, have emerged within this discontent and from
tacit agreements between the local forest agent and land-
holding families with informal customary authority over land
and natural resources.4 We focus on field research conducted
on everyday forms of fuelwood regulation, in the district of
Séguénéga, North Burkina Faso (see map below). We de-
scribe below the emergence of the tiis nanamse institution
out of the informal arrangements between state forester and
non-state customary authorities. We show that this informal
institution contributes to appeasing local discontent, and to
4Tiis naaba is also the vernacular term to qualify the official
forest agent in Mooré, but here we use it to refer to unofficial local
authorities over the bush.
keeping the wider deficient fuelwood policy, including the
CAF model, unquestioned. We call it customary fuelwood
territoriality because it has maintained the status quo over fu-
elwood policy in Burkina Faso and thereby also contributed
to expanding territorial state power.
The fuelwood permit delivered by the state forester in the
district of Séguénéga has generally not been popular with
residents. It comprises a woodcutting and a wood transporta-
tion tax, which together amounts to CFA750 for a cartload.5
However, forest agents have notoriously weak enforcement
capacities.6 Fuelwood is often collected and sold in places
far from the forest agent’s office, and woodcutters complain
that it is impractical to travel to the forest agent’s office to
pick up the required authorisation (source: woodcutter, dis-
trict of Séguénéga, interview on 21 February 2012). Poor law
enforcement has also become a problem for local residents
who see their resources declining and who complain about
deforestation:
Before, people did not sell firewood so much, but
now everyday you see carts loaded with wood
coming out of our bush. It is people from the neigh-
5This is the equivalent of EUR1.10.
6A government document reported that there are currently
around 1000 ground-level forest agents hired, which amounts to 1
agent for 25 000 to 100 000 ha areas (Dié, 2011:52).
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Figure 2. The district of Séguénega in North Burkina Faso (source: Google Earth, 2018).
bouring village. They have depleted their bush, and
now they come to get ours. (Resident, district of
Séguénéga, group interview on 4 April 2012)
Selling firewood has indeed become a profitable activity.
Residents complain that the shortage of rain causes defor-
estation, but also that “the fuelwood permit really does not
help either” (resident, district of Séguénéga, interview on 15
April 2012).
For a number of customary leaders, deforestation dynam-
ics are partly due to the fact that forest law has undermined
customary rules, such as forbidden places (zii kidse), tradi-
tionally exercised by autochthonous family lineages:
Now we don’t have rules anymore; we used to have
customs but the law of the whites came and nowwe
have no control over the bush. (Group interview,
district of Séguénéga, on 9 May 2012)
Another leader more specifically complained that
The person who has the paper [fuelwood permit]
can do what he wants, and if we see somebody in
the bush doing things against our rule, we cannot
forbid them because he shows the paper. If there
wasn’t this paper, would it be possible for any-
body to come and cut greenwood here? If they
cut greenwood they couldn’t get out of the bush,
we wouldn’t let them, but since they have the pa-
per we can’t stop them! (Village chief, district of
Séguénéga, interview on 13 April 2012)
So in the areas where there is no CAF, national fuelwood
policy has erased customary norms and, in a context of in-
creasing fuelwood demand, resource users feel that weak
state capacity exacerbates deforestation because they are not
able to exclude woodcutters and fuelwood merchants from
outside their village.
In several villages around the town of Séguénéga, individ-
uals referred by some residents as tiis nanamse intervened
to patch up policy deficiencies. These individuals are often
members of first-comer lineages because the latter gener-
ally have political authority over nature and over what may
and may not be done in the bush, outside inhabited areas.
Their authority encompasses rituals related to land fertility,
and they often arbitrate disputes taking place in the bush and
about land, such as the theft of cattle and tree fruits, and the
boundaries between fields (Kuba et al., 2003). In a village
close to Séguénéga, the district capital, the tiis naaba created
a new informal rule, a “fuelwood park” close to the small in-
formal village marketplace, as a way to regain control over
places where fuelwood would be collected. According to this
new informal system, the fuelwood brought to the park could
only be gathered by woodcutters from the village, and fu-
elwood merchants taking it to Séguénéga had to pick it up
there for an informal fee of CFA300 (the equivalent of the
woodcutting tax), which was meant for the woodcutters from
the village. The tiis naaba effectively imposed a monopoly
over fuelwood production for woodcutters from his village,
thereby aiming to address discontent about the lack of con-
trol over where and by whom fuelwood is collected (village
development representative member, district of Séguénéga,
interview on 2 April 2012; tiis naaba, village in the district
of Séguénéga, interview on 30 January 2012). He meant to
replace the official woodcutting tax with his own informal
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receipt, while leaving it to the forest agent to collect the trans-
portation tax.
The measure proved difficult to maintain, but with the tacit
agreement of the local forest agent, the tiis naaba was able
to keep prohibiting the activities of woodcutters from outside
the village. Woodcutters and merchants (often a single oper-
ator) from outside the village did not initially oppose this as
it saved them the trouble of collecting fuelwood, and it did
not incur additional spending for them. It became a problem,
however, when some woodcutters were stopped by the forest
agent transporting fuelwood without an official permit. They
explained the “new” system to the forest agent and showed
the informal receipt they were given by the tiis naaba. Al-
though this fee was informal, the forester did not oppose
it as long as the woodcutters agreed to it in addition to the
CFA750 official fuelwood permit, as it contributed to a bet-
ter oversight of forest resources. The forester justified this
decision by referring to tiis naanamse as “resource persons”:
They may not be the village chief, they may not be
the CVD [local administrative village representa-
tive], but you have to go through them to get things
done. (Forester, Séguénéga, interview on 4 May
2012)
The woodcutters of course complained about this sud-
den increase of expenses and they stopped collecting wood
within the customary territory of Sima (woodcutter, district
of Séguénéga, interview on 21 February 2012). As a result
the tiis nanamse were no longer able to collect a fee, but they
were able to successfully exclude woodcutters and merchants
from outside their village from collecting fuelwood in “their”
bush and thereby also keep contestations over a deficient fu-
elwood permit policy at bay.
In this last section we bring to light another kind of fu-
elwood territoriality, one that takes place outside CAF areas
but that also contributes to keeping the status quo around the
current fuelwood policy in Burkina Faso. We show that out-
side CAF areas official fuelwood regulation has undermined
customary rules, and customary authorities have lost control
over who comes in and out of what village residents con-
sider “their” bush. Within this context, informal institutions
have formed as a way to regain control over the bush. The
tiis nanamse informal regulation described here aimed not
to fight the official fuelwood permit but rather to exercise
greater control over “their” bush, which they obtained even-
tually with the tacit agreement of the local forester. The infor-
mal arrangement described here between state and non-state
actors is not a deviation but an integral part of the reproduc-
tion of the CAF model as “political forests” in Burkina Faso
because, by patching up the incoherence and contradictions
of a national fuelwood policy built around the CAF model, it
maintains their official status quo over these policies. We call
such arrangements customary fuelwood territoriality because
they essentially contribute to reproducing national fuelwood
policy and thereby also legitimise territorial state power in
Burkina Faso.
6 Conclusion: seeing the fuelwood territorialities
from the trees
This paper questioned the conditions under which certain
sites are repeatedly chosen for forest management initiatives
in a context where definitions for forests are multifarious and
where the areas referred to as “forest” do not necessarily have
forest ecological characteristics. We have brought this ques-
tion up through the example of the endurance and expansion
of the Chantier d’Aménagement Forestier in Burkina Faso, a
participatory forestry model that aims to rationalise sustain-
able fuelwood production. The CAF model continues to be
reproduced, namely with the support of international donors
like the Forest Investment Program, and despite the fact that
CAF areas have not been able to maintain their biomass. We
have argued that the model has produced political opportu-
nities for non-state actors that converge with government in-
terest in reproducing the CAF model. These converging po-
litical economic interests between state and non-state actors,
although deviations from policy vision, have been integral
parts of reproducing the CAF model and its state territorial-
ising effects, and this is why we call them “fuelwood territo-
rialities”.
We analysed the configurations of state and non-state po-
litical economic interests within and outside CAF areas.
We showed that within CAF areas, the production of fu-
elwood has worked in favour of large-scale fuelwood mer-
chants: CAF areas allow merchants to collect and trade larger
amounts of wood than outside CAF areas, and they have
reaped the largest part of fuelwood production profits com-
pared to the FMGs that the CAF model aims to empower.
Donors have challenged the failure of the CAF model to em-
power FMGs but, as we showed, the central government has
not brought into question the upper hand of merchants and
rather advocates for a multiplication of CAF areas for the
model to work to its full participatory potential. The conver-
gence of non-state merchant and government interests con-
tributes the territorialisation of state power by leaving the
CAF model largely unquestioned. Outside CAF areas we
analysed the everyday fuelwood regulation in the district of
Séguénéga, where we showed that the inapplicability of gov-
ernment regulation has given way to a new informal institu-
tion, the tiis naaba, that emerged from compromises between
state and non-state customary authorities and that overall
maintains the status quo over incoherent fuelwood policy and
the CAF model more widely. This latter configuration is dif-
ferent from the convergence of interests between merchants
and government described before, namely because it involves
different kinds of state and non-state actors, and relations at
different levels – the merchants’ interests converging with
national state actors, while the customary ones converge at
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local forest agents. Although these relations appear to be de-
viations from the fuelwood policy vision in Burkina Faso, we
have shown that they are integral parts of its reproduction.
With this analysis we propose a way to approach the condi-
tions under which the “political forests” described by Peluso
and Vandergeest (2001, 2011) are reproduced over time. The
CAF model strongly resonates with the “political forest”: it
takes place in the same sites as areas gazetted as “forests”
under French colonial rule; CAF areas are delineated based
on the “imported” scientific forestry idea that fuelwood pro-
duction needs to be contained in areas that are segregated
from agriculture; and the CAF model is largely “meant to
enable state agencies to regulate the socio-spatiality of floral
and faunal forest production, reproduction, extraction, and
protection” (Peluso, 2011:815) – in other words where and
by whom forest resources are produced. Drawing on Bassett
and Gautier’s (2014) polycentric approach to territorialisa-
tion processes, we emphasized the role of non-state actors in
state territorialisation.
Finally, returning to the issue of forest policy that takes
place in contexts where “forest” has a diversity of meanings,
we have emphasised in this paper that defining and demarcat-
ing “forests” is part of a political relation between different
groups – as also illustrated in the anecdote introducing this
paper. It is political in the sense that demarcating and offi-
cially keeping certain areas as “forests” may be less a prod-
uct of careful scientific assessment than of the convergence
of particular state and non-state political economic interests
as those illustrated in this paper. We see interesting further
research avenues in the role that other non-state actors play
in the reproduction of “political forests” – such as the conver-
gence of donor and government political economic interests
as another fuelwood territoriality, and the role of the partic-
ipatory forestry paradigm in cementing that relation, or the
converging relations between resource producers and local
governments whose role has expanded throughout the world
with the adoption of forest decentralisation reforms. Fuel-
wood territorialities could also be relevant in other resource
contexts – such as national parks or charcoal production ar-
eas – that also constitute political natures, and where non-
state actors are also involved in the territorialisation of state
power through national resource management policies. Such
research would help further understand how certain areas,
like the CAFs, continue to be reproduced as national natures
in the midst of their incoherence and contradictions on the
ground.
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